The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco

Rebecca Diamond, Timothy McQuade and Franklin Qian

No 24181, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We exploit quasi-experimental variation in assignment of rent control to study its impacts on tenants, landlords, and the overall rental market. Leveraging new data tracking individuals’ migration, we find rent control increased renters’ probabilities of staying at their addresses by nearly 20%. Landlords treated by rent control reduced rental housing supply by 15%, causing a 5.1% city-wide rent increase. Using a dynamic, neighborhood choice model, we find rent control offered large benefits to covered tenants. Welfare losses from decreased housing supply could be mitigated if insurance against rent increases were provided as government social insurance, instead of a regulated landlord mandate.

JEL-codes: H0 R0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
Note: LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (44)

Published as Rebecca Diamond & Tim McQuade & Franklin Qian, 2019. "The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco," American Economic Review, vol 109(9), pages 3365-3394.

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco (2019)
Working Paper: The Effects of Rent Control Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence from San Francisco (2018)
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