Statistical Discrimination and Duration Dependence in the Job Finding Rate

Gregor Jarosch and Laura Pilossoph

No 24200, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper models a frictional labor market where employers endogenously discriminate against the long term unemployed. The estimated model replicates recent experimental evidence which documents that interview invitations for observationally equivalent workers fall sharply as unemployment duration progresses. We use the model to quantitatively assess the consequences of such employer behavior for job finding rates and long term unemployment and find only modest effects given the large decline in callbacks. Interviews lost to duration impact individual job-finding rates solely if they would have led to jobs. We show that such instances are rare when firms discriminate in anticipation of an ultimately unsuccessful application. Discrimination in callbacks is thus largely a response to dynamic selection, with limited consequences for structural duration dependence and long term unemployment.

JEL-codes: E24 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-mac
Note: EFG
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published as Gregor Jarosch & Laura Pilossoph, 2019. "Statistical Discrimination and Duration Dependence in the Job Finding Rate," The Review of Economic Studies, vol 86(4), pages 1631-1665.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24200.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Statistical Discrimination and Duration Dependence in the Job Finding Rate (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24200

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24200

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().