Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies

Ashley Langer and Derek Lemoine

No 24310, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze the efficient subsidy for durable good technologies. We theoretically demonstrate that a policymaker faces a tension between intertemporally price discriminating by designing a subsidy that increases over time and taking advantage of future technological progress by designing a subsidy that decreases over time. Using dynamic estimates of household preferences for residential solar in California, we show that the efficient subsidy increases over time. The regulator's spending quintuples when households anticipate future technological progress and future subsidies.

JEL-codes: H21 H23 H71 Q48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-ino and nep-reg
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

Published as Ashley Langer & Derek Lemoine, 2022. "Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol 9(6), pages 1197-1234.

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Journal Article: Designing Dynamic Subsidies to Spur Adoption of New Technologies (2022)
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