Do Ban the Box Laws Increase Crime?

Joseph J. Sabia, Taylor Mackay, Thanh Tam Nguyen and Dhaval Dave

No 24381, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Ban-the-box (BTB) laws, which prevent employers from asking prospective employees about their criminal histories at initial job screenings, are intended to increase employment opportunities and reduce economic incentives for crime. This study is the first to comprehensively explore the relationship between state and local BTB laws and criminal arrests among racial/ethnic minorities. Using agency-by-month data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), we find that BTB laws are associated with a 10 percent increase in criminal incidents involving Hispanic male arrestees. This finding is supported by parallel analysis using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) and is consistent with BTB law-induced job loss due to employer-based statistical discrimination. We find no evidence that BTB laws increase property crime among African American men despite their also facing statistical discrimination. Supplemental analyses from the American Community Survey (ACS) suggest that barriers to welfare participation among Hispanic men may explain this result. Our estimates suggest that BTB laws generate $401 million in annual crime costs.

JEL-codes: J01 J08 K14 K31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab, nep-law and nep-ure
Note: EH LE LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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