Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia

Alexandra C. Hartman, Robert A. Blair and Christopher Blattman

No 24482, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Informal institutions govern property rights and disputes when formal systems are weak. Well-functioning institutions should help people reach and maintain bargains, minimizing violence. Can outside organizations engineer improvements and reduce violent conflicts? Will this improve property rights and investment? We experimentally evaluate a UN and civil society mass education campaign to promote alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices and norms in rural communities, where violent land disputes are common. Prior work showed a fall in violence and unresolved disputes within one year. We return after three years to test for sustained impacts and channels. Treated communities report large, sustained falls in violent disputes and a slight shift towards nonviolent norms. Treated residents also report larger farms, though overall effects on property rights and investments are mixed. Politically-connected residents report more secure property rights while those with fewer connections feel less secure. Sustained social engineering is feasible but politics shapes distributional outcomes.

JEL-codes: D74 O17 P48 Q15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-04
Note: DEV
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Alexandra C. Hartman & Robert A. Blair & Christopher Blattman, 2021. "Engineering Informal Institutions: Long-Run Impacts of Alternative Dispute Resolution on Violence and Property Rights in Liberia," The Journal of Politics, vol 83(1), pages 381-389.

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