Characterization, Existence, and Pareto Optimality in Insurance Markets with Asymmetric Information with Endogenous and Asymmetric Disclosures: Revisiting Rothschild-Stiglitz

Joseph Stiglitz, Jungyoll Yun and Andrew Kosenko

No 24711, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of competitive insurance markets with endogenous information disclosure by both firms and consumers. We show that an equilibrium always exists, (even without the single crossing property), and characterize the unique equilibrium allocation. With two types of consumers the outcome is particularly simple, consisting of a pooling allocation which maximizes the well-being of the low risk individual (along the zero profit pooling line) plus a supplemental (undisclosed and nonexclusive) contract that brings the high risk individual to full insurance (at his own odds). We show that this outcome is extremely robust and Pareto efficient.

JEL-codes: D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ias and nep-mic
Note: IO TWP
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