Tax Compliance and Enforcement

Joel Slemrod

No 24799, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper reviews recent economic research in tax compliance and enforcement. After briefly laying out the economics of tax evasion, it focuses on recent empirical contributions. It first discusses what methodologies and data have facilitated these contributions, and then presents critical summaries of what has been learned. It discusses a promising new development, the analysis of randomized controlled trials mostly delivered via letters from the tax authority, and then reviews recent research using various methods about the impact of the principal enforcement tax policy instruments: audits, information reporting, and remittance regimes. I also explore several understudied issues worthy of more research attention. The paper closes by outlining a normative framework based on the behavioral response elasticities now being credibly estimated that allows one to assess whether a given enforcement intervention is worth doing.

JEL-codes: H20 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-iue, nep-pbe and nep-pub
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

Published as Joel Slemrod, 2019. "Tax Compliance and Enforcement," Journal of Economic Literature, vol 57(4), pages 904-954.

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Journal Article: Tax Compliance and Enforcement (2019)
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