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Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence

Daniel Hungerman and Mark Wilhelm

No 24940, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present a new model of charitable giving where individuals regard out-of-pocket donations and the matches they induce as different. We show that match-price elasticities combine conventional price effects with the strength of warm-glow, so that a match-price elasticity alone is insufficient to characterize preferences for giving. Match- and rebate-price elasticities will typically be different, but together they lead to tests of underlying giving preferences. We estimate, for the first time, a match-price elasticity together with a real-world tax-based rebate elasticity in a non-laboratory high-stakes setting. The estimates reject extant models of giving, but are consistent with the new theory.

JEL-codes: D64 H41 L31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
Note: PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Daniel M. Hungerman & Mark Ottoni-Wilhelm, 2021. "Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, vol 129(5), pages 1553-1614.

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Journal Article: Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence (2021) Downloads
Working Paper: Impure Impact Giving: Theory and Evidence (2018) Downloads
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