Authoritarian Elites

Adlai Newson and Francesco Trebbi

No 24966, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We explore the role of ruling elites in autocratic regimes and provide an assessment of tools useful to clarify the structure of opaque political environments. We first showcase the importance of analyzing autocratic regimes as non-unitary actors by discussing extant work on nondemocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa and China, where the prevailing view of winner-take-all contests can be clearly rejected. We show how specific biographical information about powerful cadres helps shed light upon the composition of the inner circles that empower autocrats. We further provide an application of these methods to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), one of the most personalistic, opaque, and data-poor political regimes in the world today. Employing information from DPRK state media on participants at official state events, we are able to trace the evolution and consolidation of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un around the transition period following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. The internal factional divisions of the DPRK are explored during and after this transition. Final general considerations for the future study of the political economy of development are presented.

JEL-codes: P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Note: DEV POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Adlai Newson & Francesco Trebbi, 2018. "Authoritarian elites," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, vol 51(4), pages 1088-1117.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24966.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Authoritarian elites (2018)
Journal Article: Authoritarian elites (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:24966

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w24966

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().