Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism

Umut Dur, Parag Pathak, Fei Song and Tayfun Sönmez

No 25024, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper analyzes the properties of the Taiwan mechanism, used for high school placement nationwide starting in 2014. In the Taiwan mechanism, points are deducted from an applicant's score with larger penalties for lower ranked choices. Deduction makes the mechanism a new hybrid between the well-known Boston and deferred acceptance mechanisms. Our analysis sheds light on why Taiwan's new mechanism has led to massive nationwide demonstrations and why it nonetheless still remains in use.

JEL-codes: D47 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Published as Umut Dur & Parag A. Pathak & Fei Song & Tayfun Sönmez, 2022. "Deduction Dilemmas: The Taiwan Assignment Mechanism," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, vol 14(1), pages 164-185.

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