Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions

Samuel Bazzi, Sarah Burns, Gordon Hanson, Bryan Roberts and John Whitley

No 25100, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Over 2008 to 2012, the U.S. Border Patrol enacted new sanctions on migrants apprehended attempting to enter the U.S. illegally. Using administrative records on apprehensions of Mexican nationals that include fingerprint-based IDs and other details, we detect if an apprehended migrant is subject to penalties and if he is later re-apprehended. Exploiting plausibly random variation in the roll-out of sanctions, we estimate econometrically that exposure to penalties reduced the 18-month re-apprehension rate for males by 4.6 to 6.1 percentage points off of a baseline rate of 24.2%. These magnitudes imply that sanctions can account for 28 to 44 percent of the observed decline in recidivism in apprehensions. Further results suggest that the drop in recidivism was associated with a reduction in attempted illegal entry.

JEL-codes: F22 J61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mig and nep-ure
Note: DEV ITI LS
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Samuel Bazzi & Gordon Hanson & Sarah John & Bryan Roberts & John Whitley, 2021. "Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 13(3), pages 1-27, August.

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Journal Article: Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions (2021)
Working Paper: Deterring Illegal Entry: Migrant Sanctions and Recidivism in Border Apprehensions (2019)
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