Randomness in Tax Enforcement

Suzanne Scotchmer and Joel Slemrod

No 2512, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: For most parameter values, increased randomness about how much taxable income an auditor would assess leads to higher reported income and more revenue, When reducing randomness is costly, optimality requires some randomness in assessed taxable Income. Even if reducing randomness g costless, taxpayers may prefer some randomness when the increased revenue can be rebated, so that the government a revenue stays fixed. These results do not rely on the presence of a distortion in labor supply.

Date: 1988-02
Note: PE
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Published as Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 38, no. 1 (February 1999): 17-32.

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Journal Article: Randomness in tax enforcement (1989)
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