Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions

Garance Genicot, Laurent Bouton and Micael Castanheira

No 25205, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies the political determinants of inequality in government interventions under the majoritarian and proportional representation systems. Using a model of electoral competition with targetable government intervention and heterogeneous localities, we uncover a novel relative electoral sensitivity effect in majoritarian systems. This effect, which depends on the geographic distribution of voters, can incentivize parties to allocate resources more equally under majoritarian systems than proportional representation systems. This contrasts with the conventional wisdom that government interventions are more unequal in majoritarian systems.

JEL-codes: D72 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Published as Garance Genicot & Laurent Bouton & Micael Castanheira, 2021. "Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions," Journal of the European Economic Association, vol 19(6), pages 3154-3206.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions (2021)
Working Paper: Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions (2021)
Working Paper: Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions (2020)
Working Paper: Electoral Systems and Inequalities in Government Interventions (2018)
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