Tolerance and Compromise in Social Networks

Garance Genicot

No 25506, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, individuals are characterized by their identity — an ideal code of conduct — and by a level of tolerance for behaviors that differ from their own ideal. Individuals first choose their behavior, then form social networks. This paper studies the possibility of compromise, i.e. individuals choosing a behavior different from their ideal point, in order to be accepted by others, to "belong.'' I first show that when tolerance levels are the same in society, compromise is impossible: individuals all choose their preferred behavior and form friendships only with others whose ideal point belong to their tolerance window. In contrast, I show that heterogeneity in tolerance allows for compromise in equilibrium. Moreover, if identity and tolerance are independently distributed, any equilibrium involves some compromise.

JEL-codes: D85 L14 O12 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic, nep-soc and nep-ure
Note: POL
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Published as Garance Genicot, 2022. "Tolerance and Compromise in Social Networks," Journal of Political Economy, vol 130(1), pages 94-120.

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Journal Article: Tolerance and Compromise in Social Networks (2022)
Working Paper: Tolerance and Compromise in Social Networks (2021)
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