Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion

Timothy Besley, Anders Jensen and Torsten Persson ()

No 25575, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and is the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the UK, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predictions on the dynamics of evasion.

JEL-codes: H26 H3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-iue, nep-law, nep-pbe, nep-pub and nep-soc
Note: PE POL
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (33)

Published as Timothy Besley & Anders Jensen & Torsten Persson, 2023. "Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion," Review of Economics and Statistics, vol 105(4), pages 998-1007.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Norms, enforcement, and tax evasion (2021)
Working Paper: Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion (2015)
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