How Common are Electoral Cycles in Criminal Sentencing?

Christian Dippel and Mikhail Poyker

No 25716, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Existing research on electoral sentencing cycles shows that elected judges levy longer sentences when they are up for re-election. Using newly collected sentencing data including a number of states not previously studied, we find that elected judges in several states do not appear to change their sentencing when they are up for re-election. This heterogeneity in the presence of electoral sentencing cycles appears to be best explained by cross-state variation in the competitiveness of judicial elections. Incumbent judges do levy harsher sentences when they are in a competitive re-election campaign, but in states where competition for judgeships is low this does not come to the forefront.

JEL-codes: D72 H76 K41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-law and nep-pol
Note: LE LS PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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