Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?

Jeremy I. Bulow and Kenneth Rogoff

No 2623, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: International lending to a less-developed country cannot be based on the debtor's reputation for making repayments. That is, loans to LDCs will not be made or repaid unless foreign creditors have legal or other direct sanctions they can exercise against a sovereign debtor who defaults Even if some lending is feasible because of direct sanctions, having a reputation for repayment in no way enhances a small LDC's ability to borrow.

Date: 1988-06
Note: ITI IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published as Bulow, Jeremy and Kenneth Rogoff. "Sovereign Debt: Is To Forgive To Forget?" from American Economic Review, Vol. 79, 1989.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget (1998)
Journal Article: Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget? (1989)
Working Paper: SOVEREIGN DEBT: IS TO FORGIVE TO FORGET? (1988)
Working Paper: SOVEREIGN DEBT: IS TO FORGIVE TO FORGET? (1988)
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