EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Getting Tired of Your Friends: The Dynamics of Venture Capital Relationships

Qianqian Du and Thomas Hellmann ()

No 26274, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Does doing more deals together always strengthen investor relationships? Based on the relationships of the top 50 US venture capital firms, this paper focuses on the strengths of relationships and their dynamic evolution. Empirical estimates indicate that having a deeper relationship leads to fewer, not more future coinvestments. Moreover, deeper relationships lead to lower exit performance, even after controlling for endogeneity. Interestingly, deeper relationships first lead to lower performance, and subsequently lead to a slowdown in the relationship intensity. Relationship effects are more negative for VC firms with less central network positions, and for deals made in “hot” investment markets.

JEL-codes: G24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn and nep-sbm
Note: CF PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26274.pdf (application/pdf)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26274

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w26274
The price is Paper copy available by mail.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().

 
Page updated 2020-06-30
Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:26274