The Old Boys' Club: Schmoozing and the Gender Gap

Zoë B. Cullen and Ricardo Perez-Truglia

No 26530, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Offices are social places. Employees and managers take breaks together and talk about family and hobbies. In this study, we show that employees’ social interactions with their managers can be advantageous for their careers, and that this phenomenon contributes to the gender pay gap. We use administrative and survey data from a large financial institution and exploit quasi-random variation induced by the rotation of managers. We provide evidence that when employees have more face-to-face interactions with their managers, they are promoted at a higher rate. This mechanism could explain a third of the gender gap in promotions at this firm.

JEL-codes: J01 J16 J7 Z1 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gen and nep-lab
Note: DEV LE LS PE POL PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Zoë Cullen & Ricardo Perez-Truglia, 2023. "The Old Boys’ Club: Schmoozing and the Gender Gap," American Economic Review, vol 113(7), pages 1703-1740.

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