Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword

Harold Cole, Dirk Krueger, George Mailath and Yena Park

No 26667, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze efficient risk-sharing arrangements when the value from deviating is determined endogenously by another risk sharing arrangement. Coalitions form to insure against idiosyncratic income risk. Self-enforcing contracts for both the original coalition and any coalition formed (joined) after deviations rely on a belief in future cooperation which we term “trust”. We treat the contracting conditions of original and deviation coalitions symmetrically and show that higher trust tightens incentive constraints since it facilitates the formation of deviating coalitions. As a consequence, although trust facilitates the initial formation of coalitions, the extent of risk sharing in successfully formed coalitions is declining in the extent of trust and efficient allocations might feature resource burning or utility burning: trust is indeed a double-edged sword.

JEL-codes: D15 D16 E20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-gth, nep-mac and nep-opm
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Published as Harold L Cole & Dirk Krueger & George J Mailath & Yena Park, 2024. "Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword," Review of Economic Studies, vol 91(3), pages 1448-1497.

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Journal Article: Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword (2024)
Working Paper: Trust in Risk Sharing: A Double-Edged Sword (2020)
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