Optimal Regulation of E-cigarettes: Theory and Evidence
Hunt Allcott () and
No 27000, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
There is an active debate about how to regulate electronic cigarettes, due to uncertainty about their health effects and whether they are primarily a quit aid or a gateway drug for combustible cigarettes. We model optimal e-cigarette regulation and estimate key parameters. Using tax changes and scanner data, we estimate relatively elastic demand and limited substitution between e-cigarettes and combustible cigarettes. In sample surveys, historical smoking trends for high- and low-vaping demographics were unchanged after e-cigarettes were introduced; this demographic shift-share identification also suggests limited substitution. We field a new quantitative survey of public health experts, who report that vaping is more harmful than previously believed. In our model, the optimal e-cigarette tax is probably higher than the current norm, but Monte Carlo simulations highlight substantial uncertainty.
JEL-codes: D12 D18 D61 H21 H23 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ore and nep-pub
Note: HC HE LE PE
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to the full text is generally limited to series subscribers, however if the top level domain of the client browser is in a developing country or transition economy free access is provided. More information about subscriptions and free access is available at http://www.nber.org/wwphelp.html. Free access is also available to older working papers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27000
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
The price is Paper copy available by mail.
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().