A Theory of Managed Trade

Kyle Bagwell and Robert Staiger

No 2756, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This paper proposes a theory that predicts low levels of protection during periods of "normal" trade volume coupled with episodes of "special" protection when trade volumes surge. This dynamic pattern of protection emerges from a model in which countries choose levels of protection in a repeated game setting facing volatile trade swings. High trade volume leads to a greater incentive to unilaterally defect from cooperative tariff levels. Therefore as the volume of trade expands, the level of protection must rise in a cooperative equilibrium to mitigate the rising trade volume and hold the incentive to defect in check.

Date: 1988-11
Note: ITI IFM
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as American Economic Review, September 1990.

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Theory of Managed Trade (1990)
Working Paper: A Theory of Managed Trade (1989)
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