Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination

Michael D. Frakes and Melissa F. Wasserman

No 27579, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We explore how the Patent Office may improve the quality of issued patents on “secondary” drug features by giving examiners more time to review drug-patent applications. Our findings suggest that current time allocations are causing examiners to issue low quality secondary patents on the margin. To assess the merits of expanding ex ante scrutiny of drug-patent applications at the agency, we set forth estimates of the various gains and losses associated with giving examiners more time, including reduced downstream litigation costs and added personnel expenses, along with both the static gains and dynamic innovation losses associated with earlier generic entry.

JEL-codes: I18 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-hea, nep-ino, nep-ipr and nep-law
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Published as Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, 2023. "Investing in Ex Ante Regulation: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Patent Examination," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, vol 15(3), pages 151-183.

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