A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards

Michael J. Fishman, Jonathan Parker and Ludwig Straub

No 27610, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze a dynamic credit market where banks choose lending standards, modeled as costly effort to screen out bad borrowers. Tighter standards worsen the borrower pool, increasing banks’ incentives to employ tight standards in the future. This dynamic complementarity in lending standards can amplify and prolong downturns, decreasing lending and increasing credit spreads. Because lending standards have negative externalities, the market can converge to a steady state with inefficiently tight lending standards. We discuss the role of optimal policy to avoid this outcome as well as the impact of balance sheet costs on lending standards.

JEL-codes: D82 E51 G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dge, nep-ias, nep-mac and nep-mic
Note: AP CF EFG ME
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published as Michael J Fishman & Jonathan A Parker & Ludwig Straub & Itay Goldstein, 2024. "A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 37(8), pages 2355-2402.

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards (2024)
Working Paper: A Dynamic Theory of Lending Standards (2019)
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