Information Frictions and Access to the Paycheck Protection Program

Christopher Neilson, John Humphries and Gabriel Ulyssea ()

No 27624, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) extended 669 billion dollars of forgivable loans in an unprecedented effort to support small businesses affected by the COVID-19 crisis. This paper provides evidence that information frictions and the “first-come, first-served” design of the PPP program skewed its resources towards larger firms and may have permanently reduced its effectiveness. Using new daily survey data on small businesses in the U.S., we show that the smallest businesses were less aware of the PPP and less likely to apply. If they did apply, the smallest businesses applied later, faced longer processing times, and were less likely to have their application approved. These frictions may have mattered, as businesses that received aid report fewer layoffs, higher employment, and improved expectations about the future.

JEL-codes: H0 J01 J08 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-ore
Note: LS PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (62)

Published as Humphries, John Eric & Neilson, Christopher A. & Ulyssea, Gabriel, 2020. "Information frictions and access to the Paycheck Protection Program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 190(C).

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Journal Article: Information frictions and access to the Paycheck Protection Program (2020)
Working Paper: Information Frictions and Access to the Paycheck Protection Program (2020)
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