Persuasion on Networks

Georgy Egorov and Konstantin Sonin

No 27631, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We analyze persuasion in a model in which each receiver can buy a direct access to the sender's signal or rely on her network connections to get it. For the sender, a higher bias increases the impact per direct receiver, yet diminishes the willingness of agents to receive information. Contrary to naive intuition, the optimal propaganda might target peripheral, rather than centrally-located agents, and is at its maximum levels when the probability that information flows between agents is close to zero or one, but not in-between. The impact of network density depends on this probability as well.

JEL-codes: D85 L82 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-net
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: Persuasion on Networks (2019)
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