Learning from Deregulation: The Asymmetric Impact of Lockdown and Reopening on Risky Behavior During COVID-19
Edward Glaeser,
Ginger Zhe Jin,
Benjamin Leyden and
Michael Luca
No 27650, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
During the COVID-19 pandemic, states issued and then rescinded stay-at-home orders that restricted mobility. We develop a model of learning by deregulation, which predicts that lifting stay-at-home orders can signal that going out has become safer. Using restaurant activity data, we find that the implementation of stay-at-home orders initially had a limited impact, but that activity rose quickly after states’ reopenings. The results suggest that consumers inferred from reopening that it was safer to eat out. The rational, but mistaken inference that occurs in our model may explain why a sharp rise of COVID-19 cases followed reopening in some states.
JEL-codes: D8 I18 K0 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-08
Note: EH LE PE POL PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)
Published as Edward L. Glaeser & Ginger Z. Jin & Benjamin T. Leyden & Michael Luca, 2021. "Learning from deregulation: The asymmetric impact of lockdown and reopening on risky behavior during COVID‐19," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(4), pages 696-709, September.
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Journal Article: Learning from deregulation: The asymmetric impact of lockdown and reopening on risky behavior during COVID‐19 (2021) 
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