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Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle

Michael Ewens and Nadya Malenko

No 27769, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We explore the dynamics of venture capital (VC)-backed startup boards using novel data on director entry, exit, and characteristics. At formation, a typical board is entrepreneur-controlled. Independent directors join the median board after the second financing, when control becomes shared, and hold a tie-breaking vote. Their presence is particularly likely when the potential for VC-entrepreneur conflicts is higher. At later stages, control switches to VCs and independent director characteristics change. These patterns are consistent with independent directors playing both a mediating and advising role over the startup life cycle, and thus representing another potential source of value-add to startup performance.

JEL-codes: G24 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-ent and nep-sbm
Note: CF PR
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Board dynamics over the startup life cycle (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Board Dynamics over the Startup Life Cycle (2020) Downloads
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