Measuring Property Rights Institutions

Simeon Djankov, Edward Glaeser, Valeria Perotti and Andrei Shleifer

No 27839, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How do the different elements in the standard bundle of property rights – such as the right of possession or the right of transfer – differentially impact outcomes, such as urban development? This paper incorporates insecure property rights into a standard model of urban land prices and density, and makes predictions about investment in land and property, informality, and the efficiency of land use. Our empirical analysis links data on institutions related to land titling and transfer with multiple urban outcomes, from 190 countries. The evidence is generally consistent with the model’s predictions, and more broadly with the Demsetz’s (1967) approach to property rights institutions. Indeed, we document world-wide improvements in the quality of institutions facilitating property transfer over time.

JEL-codes: O17 O18 O43 R14 R21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
Note: DEV POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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