Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the United States Social Supplementary Income Program

C. Yiwei Zhang, Jeffrey Hemmeter, Judd B. Kessler, Robert Metcalfe () and Robert Weathers

No 27875, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study a large-scale (n=50,000) natural field experiment implemented by the U.S. Social Security Administration that was aimed at increasing the timely and accurate self-reporting of wages by Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients. Sending a letter reminding SSI recipients of their wage reporting responsibilities significantly increased both the likelihood of reporting any earnings and the total amount of earnings reported, though this effect decays slightly over time. However, the specific letter content—providing social information or highlighting the salience of penalties—had no systematic effect. We develop a conservative estimate that the letters generated roughly $5.91 in savings on average per dollar spent for the U.S. government.

JEL-codes: D04 H2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Note: PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as C. Yiwei Zhang , Jeffrey Hemmeter, Judd B. Kessler , Robert D. Metcalfe, Robert Weathers. "Nudging Timely Wage Reporting: Field Experimental Evidence from the U.S. Supplemental Security Income Program," Management Science, Vol. 69, No. 3. March 2023

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