A Q-Theory of Banks
Juliane Begenau,
Saki Bigio,
Jeremy Majerovitz and
Matias Vieyra ()
No 27935, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
We introduce a dynamic bank theory featuring delayed loss recognition and a regulatory capital constraint, aiming to match the bank leverage dynamics captured by Tobin’s Q. We start from four facts: (1) book and market equity values diverge, especially during crises; (2) Tobin’s Q predicts future bank profitability; (3) neither book nor market leverage constraints are strictly binding for most banks; and (4) bank leverage and Tobin’s Q are mean reverting but highly persistent. We demonstrate that delayed loss accounting rules interact with bank capital requirements, introducing a tradeoff between loan growth and financial fragility. Our welfare analysis implies that accounting rules and capital regulation should optimally be set jointly. This paper emphasizes the need to reconcile regulatory dependence on book values with the market’s emphasis on fundamental values to enhance understanding of banking dynamics and improve regulatory design.
JEL-codes: G21 G32 G33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc and nep-ban
Note: CF EFG ME
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27935.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A Q-Theory of Banks (2024) 
Working Paper: A Q-Theory of Banks (2021) 
Working Paper: A Q-Theory of Banks (2021) 
Working Paper: A q-theory of banks (2021) 
Working Paper: A Q-Theory Of Banks (2020) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:27935
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w27935
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().