Wages, Hires, and Labor Market Concentration

Ioana Marinescu, Ivan Ouss and Louis-Daniel Pape

No 28084, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: How does employer market power affect workers? We compute the concentration of new hires by occupation and commuting zone in France using linked employer-employee data. Using instrumental variables with worker and firm fixed effects, we find that a 10% increase in labor market concentration decreases hires by 12.4% and the wages of new hires by nearly 0.9%, as hypothesized by monopsony theory. Based on a simple merger simulation, we find that a merger between the top two employers in the retail industry would be most damaging, with about 24 million euros in annual lost wages for new hires, and an 8000 decrease in annual hires.

JEL-codes: J23 J3 J42 K21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-eur, nep-hrm, nep-law, nep-lma and nep-ure
Note: IO LS
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Published as Marinescu, Ioana & Ouss, Ivan & Pape, Louis-Daniel, 2021. "Wages, hires, and labor market concentration," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 184(C), pages 506-605.

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Journal Article: Wages, hires, and labor market concentration (2021)
Working Paper: Wages, hires, and labor market concentration (2021)
Working Paper: Wages, Hires, and Labor Market Concentration (2020)
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