Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting

Francesco Decarolis, Raymond Fisman, Paolo Pinotti and Silvia Vannutelli

No 28209, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The benefits of bureaucratic discretion depend on the extent to which it is used for public benefit versus exploited for private gain. We study the relationship between discretion and corruption in Italian government procurement auctions, using a confidential database of firms and procurement officials investigated for corruption by Italian enforcement authorities. We show that discretionary procedure auctions (those awarded based on negotiated rather than open bidding) are associated with corruption only when accompanied by limits to competition. We further show that, while these “corruptible” discretionary auctions are chosen more often by officials who are themselves investigated for corruption, they are used less often in procurement administrations in which at least one official is investigated for corruption. These findings fit with a framework in which more discretion leads to greater efficiency as well as more opportunities for theft, and a central monitor manages this trade-off by limiting discretion for high-corruption procedures and locales. Overall, our results suggest that competition may allow procurement authorities to extract the benefits of discretion while limiting the resultant risks of abuse.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 H57 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: IO LE PE POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting (2020)
Working Paper: Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting (2020)
Working Paper: Rules, Discretion, and Corruption in Procurement: Evidence from Italian Government Contracting (2019)
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