Simple and Credible Value-Added Estimation Using Centralized School Assignment
Joshua Angrist (),
Peter Hull (),
Parag Pathak and
No 28241, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Many large urban school districts match students to schools using algorithms that incorporate an element of random assignment. We introduce two simple empirical strategies to harness this randomization for value-added models (VAMs) measuring the causal effects of individual schools. The first estimator controls for the probability of being offered admission to different schools, treating the take-up decision as independent of potential outcomes. Randomness in school assignments is used to test this key conditional independence assumption. The second estimator uses randomness in offers to generate instrumental variables (IVs) for school enrollment. This procedure uses a low-dimensional model of school quality mediators to solve the under-identification challenge arising from the fact that some schools are under-subscribed. Both approaches relax the assumptions of conventional value-added models while obviating the need for elaborate nonlinear estimators. In applications to data from Denver and New York City, we find that models controlling for both assignment risk and lagged achievement yield highly reliable VAM estimates. Estimates from models with fewer controls and older lagged score controls are improved markedly by IV.
JEL-codes: C11 C21 C26 C52 I21 I28 J24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-ecm, nep-ore and nep-ure
Note: CH ED LS PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Simple and Credible Value-Added Estimation Using Centralized School Assignment (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28241
Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().