Gender and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries

Francesco Decarolis, Raymond Fisman, Paolo Pinotti, Silvia Vannutelli and Yongxiang Wang

No 28397, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We examine the correlation between gender and bureaucratic corruption using two distinct datasets, one from Italy and a second from China. In each case, we find that women are far less likely to be investigated for corruption than men. In our Italian data, female procurement officials are 34 percent less likely than men to be investigated for corruption by enforcement authorities; in China, female prefectural leaders are as much as 75 percent less likely to be arrested for corruption than men. While these represent correlations (rather than definitive causal effects), both are very robust relationships, which survive the inclusion of fine-grained individual and geographic controls.

JEL-codes: D73 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-gen
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Published as Francesco Decarolis & Raymond Fisman & Paolo Pinotti & Silvia Vannutelli & Yongxiang Wang, 2023. "Gender and Bureaucratic Corruption: Evidence from Two Countries," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol 39(2), pages 557-585.

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