Owner Incentives and Performance in Healthcare: Private Equity Investment in Nursing Homes

Atul Gupta, Sabrina T. Howell, Constantine Yannelis and Abhinav Gupta

No 28474, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Amid an aging population and a growing role for private equity (PE) in elder care, this paper studies how PE ownership affects U.S. nursing homes using patient-level Medicare data. We show that PE ownership leads to lower-risk patients and increases mortality. After instrumenting for the patient-nursing home match, we recover a local average treatment effect on mortality of 11%. Declines in measures of patient well-being, nurse staffing, and compliance with care standards help to explain the mortality effect. Overall, we conclude that PE has nuanced effects, with adverse outcomes for a subset of patients.

JEL-codes: G3 G32 G34 G38 I1 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-fmk, nep-hea and nep-ias
Note: CF EH PR TWP
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)

Published as Atul Gupta & Sabrina T Howell & Constantine Yannelis & Abhinav Gupta & Gregor Matvos, 2024. "Owner Incentives and Performance in Healthcare: Private Equity Investment in Nursing Homes," The Review of Financial Studies, vol 37(4), pages 1029-1077.

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