Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence

Alberto Bisin, Jared Rubin, Avner Seror and Thierry Verdier

No 28488, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Recent theories of the Long Divergence between Middle Eastern and Western European economies focus on Middle Eastern (over-)reliance on religious legitimacy, use of slave soldiers, and persistence of restrictive proscriptions of religious (Islamic) law. These theories take as exogenous the cultural values that complement the prevailing institutions. As a result, they miss the role of cultural values in either supporting the persistence of or inducing change in the economic and institutional environment. In this paper, we address these issues by modeling the joint evolution of institutions and culture. In doing so, we place the various hypotheses of economic divergence into one, unifying framework. We highlight the role that cultural transmission plays in reinforcing institutional evolution toward either theocratic or secular states. We extend the model to shed light on political decentralization and technological change in the two regions.

JEL-codes: N34 N35 O10 O33 P16 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul, nep-evo and nep-isf
Note: POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

Published as Alberto Bisin & Jared Rubin & Avner Seror & Thierry Verdier, 2024. "Culture, institutions and the long divergence," Journal of Economic Growth, vol 29(1), pages 1-40.

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Related works:
Working Paper: Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence (2021)
Working Paper: Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence (2021)
Working Paper: Culture, Institutions & the Long Divergence (2021)
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