Doing Business in China: Parental Background and Government Intervention Determine Who Owns Businesses

Ruixue Jia, Xiaohuan Lan and Gerard Padró I Miquel

No 28547, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: While intergenerational transmission of entrepreneurship is a well-known regularity, we hypothesize that in a transition economy where the state retains an important role, those whose parents are government workers may also be more likely to become business owners. We test the hypothesis in China and show that (1) on average, both entrepreneurs and government workers have a higher likelihood of having children who own incorporated businesses and (2) In provinces where government involvement is higher, the likelihood that children of government workers (entrepreneurs) own incorporated businesses is significantly higher (lower). Our study demonstrates that the local economic business environment shapes the influence of parental background on business ownership.

JEL-codes: D02 D72 O12 O38 O53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna, nep-ent and nep-tra
Note: DEV POL PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

Published as Ruixue Jia & Xiaohuan Lan & Gerard Padró i Miquel, 2021. "Doing business in China: Parental background and government intervention determine who owns busines," Journal of Development Economics, vol 151.

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