Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt

Andres Gonzalez-Lira and Ahmed Mobarak
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andres Gonzalez Lira

No 28610, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Attempts to curb undesired behavior through regulation gets complicated when agents can adapt to circumvent enforcement. We test a model of enforcement with learning and adaptation, by auditing vendors selling illegal fish in Chile in a randomized controlled trial, and tracking them daily using mystery shoppers. Conducting audits on a predictable schedule and (counter-intuitively) at high frequency is less effective, as agents learn to take advantage of loopholes. A consumer information campaign proves to be almost as cost-effective and curbing illegal sales, and obviates the need for complex monitoring and policing. The Chilean government subsequently chooses to scale up this campaign.

JEL-codes: K42 L51 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-reg
Note: DEV EEE LE POL
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Working Paper: Slippery Fish: Enforcing Regulation when Agents Learn and Adapt (2021)
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