Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?
Adrianna L. McIntyre,
Mark Shepard and
Myles Wagner
No 28630, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
Abstract:
There is growing interest in market design using default rules and other choice architecture principles to steer consumers toward desirable outcomes. Using data from Massachusetts’ health insurance exchange, we study an "automatic retention" policy intended to prevent coverage interruptions among low-income enrollees. Rather than disenroll people who lapse in paying premiums, the policy automatically switches them to an available free plan until they actively cancel or lose eligibility. We find that automatic retention has a sizable impact, switching 14% of consumers annually and differentially retaining healthy, low-cost individuals. The results illustrate the power of defaults to shape insurance coverage outcomes.
JEL-codes: D90 I13 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hea, nep-ias and nep-ore
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Published as Adrianna McIntyre & Mark Shepard & Myles Wagner, 2021. "Can Automatic Retention Improve Health Insurance Market Outcomes?," AEA Papers and Proceedings, vol 111, pages 560-566.
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