Combating Political Corruption with Policy Bundles

Frederico Finan and Maurizio Mazzocco

No 28683, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a dynamic model of politicians who can engage in corruption. The model offers important insights into what determines corruption and how to design policy to combat it. We estimate the model using data from Brazil to measure voters' willingness to pay for various commonly-proposed anti-corruption policies, such as increasing audit probabilities, increasing politicians' wages, and extending term limits. We document that while voters have a high willingness to pay for audit policies, due to their effectiveness in reducing corruption, a multi-pronged approach that bundles certain policies can achieve similar welfare gains at a fraction of the cost.

JEL-codes: D72 D73 O1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
Note: DEV POL
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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