On the Welfare Gains from Tradeable Benefits-in-Kind

Martin Ravallion

No 28728, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Governments often prohibit resale of the benefits-in-kind provided by antipoverty programs. Yet the personal gains from those benefits are likely to vary and to be known privately, so there can be gains to poor people from trading their assignments. We know very little about those gains. To help address this knowledge gap, the paper models a competitive market for assignments, and simulates the market using an unusual survey of workers on a rural public-works scheme in a poor state of India. The results indicate large gains from tradeable assignments after first randomizing. The gains exceed those from poverty targeting without trade and are not lower for poorer households or female workers. Fully realizing the gains from trade in practice may require complementary policies to help people access the market and to support its administration and regulation.

JEL-codes: H30 I38 O15 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-04
Note: DEV PE
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