Is Public Equity Deadly? Evidence from Workplace Safety and Productivity Tradeoffs in the Coal Industry

Erik P. Gilje and Michael D. Wittry

No 28798, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We study how ownership structure, in particular public listing status, affects workplace safety and productivity tradeoffs. Theory offers competing hypotheses on how listing related frictions affect these tradeoffs. We exploit detailed asset-level data in the U.S. coal industry and find that workplace safety deteriorates dramatically under public firm ownership, primarily in mines that experience the largest productivity increases. We find evidence consistent with information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of public firms, and ties of private firm ownership with local communities being first-order drivers of workplace safety and productivity tradeoffs.

JEL-codes: G30 G32 G34 J24 J38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cfn, nep-eff, nep-ene and nep-lma
Note: CF
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