Automated Enforcement of Irrigation Regulations and Social Pressure for Water Conservation

Jeremy West, Robert Fairlie, Bryan E. Pratt and Liam Rose

No 28823, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This study evaluates two interventions for residential water conservation. Comparing households across an enforcement algorithm’s cutoff using a regression discontinuity design, we find that automated irrigation violation warnings cause substantial water conservation but also shift some consumption from regulated to unregulated hours within the week. In contrast, we show using data from a randomized experiment with the same customers that normative Home Water Reports reduce water use by a much smaller amount, but that this social pressure is effective during all hours both before and after automating irrigation policy enforcement. Our findings highlight the merits of implementing multidimensional conservation programs.

JEL-codes: D04 L98 Q25 R22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
Note: EEE IO PE
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Published as Jeremy West & Robert W. Fairlie & Bryan Pratt & Liam Rose, 2021. "Automated Enforcement of Irrigation Regulations and Social Pressure for Water Conservation," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol 8(6), pages 1179-1207.

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Related works:
Journal Article: Automated Enforcement of Irrigation Regulations and Social Pressure for Water Conservation (2021)
Working Paper: Automated Enforcement of Irrigation Regulations and Social Pressure for Water Conservation (2021)
Working Paper: Automated Enforcement of Irrigation Regulations and Social Pressure for Water Conservation (2021)
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