When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking

Judson Boomhower

No 28857, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: The electoral salience of some issues may diminish when one politician has authority over many policy areas. This study measures the role of environmental regulation in concurrent elections for governors and specialized energy regulators in two U.S. states. I first show that while both offices can influence environmental and energy policies, quantitative analysis of campaign news coverage reveals clear differences in the importance of these issues in the two races. Next, I use geologic variation in earthquakes caused by oil and gas production to measure the electoral consequences of a costly environmental externality. There are measurable effects only in the energy regulator race. These results are consistent with theories of issue bundling. Finally, the unbundling effects that I measure appear to be themselves limited by voter attentiveness and partisanship.

JEL-codes: D72 H11 Q35 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-pol
Note: EEE POL
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Published as Judson Boomhower, 2024. "When Do Environmental Externalities Have Electoral Consequences? Evidence from Fracking," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol 11(4), pages 999-1029.

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