Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design

Kyle Greenberg, Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sönmez

No 28911, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We present the proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (Sönmez, 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on the desiderata of stakeholders with minimal interference. Four objectives – respecting merit, increasing retention, aligning talent, and enhancing trust – guided reforms to US Army’s centralized branching process of cadets to military specialties since 2006. USMA’s mechanism for the Class of 2020 exacerbated challenges implementing these objectives. Formulating the Army’s desiderata as rigorous axioms, we analyze their implications. Under our minimalist approach to institution redesign, the Army’s objectives uniquely identify a branching mechanism. Our design is now adopted at USMA and ROTC.

JEL-codes: D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
Note: LS PE
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Published as Kyle Greenberg & Parag A. Pathak & Tayfun Sönmez, 2024. "Redesigning the US Army’s Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design," American Economic Review, vol 114(4), pages 1070-1106.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28911.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design (2024)
Working Paper: Redesigning the US Army's Branching Process: A Case Study in Minimalist Market Design (2023)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:nbr:nberwo:28911

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.nber.org/papers/w28911

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (wpc@nber.org).