Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice

Felipe Arteaga, Adam J. Kapor, Christopher Neilson and Seth Zimmerman

No 28946, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Many school districts with centralized school choice adopt strategyproof assignment mechanisms to relieve applicants of the need to strategize on the basis of beliefs about their own admissions chances. This paper shows that beliefs about admissions chances shape choice outcomes even when the assignment mechanism is strategyproof by influencing the way applicants search for schools, and that “smart matching platforms” that provide live feedback on admissions chances help applicants search more effectively. Motivated by a model in which applicants engage in costly search for schools and over-optimism can lead to under-search, we use data from a large-scale survey of choice participants in Chile to show that learning about schools is hard, that beliefs about admissions chances guide the decision to stop searching, and that applicants systematically underestimate non-placement risk. We then use RCT and RD research designs to evaluate scaled live feedback policies in the Chilean and New Haven choice systems. 22% of applicants submitting applications where risks of non-placement are high respond to warnings by adding schools to their lists, reducing non-placement risk by 58% and increasing test score value added at the schools where they enroll by 0.10 standard deviations. Reducing the burden of school choice requires not just strategyproofness inside the centralized system, but also choice supports for the strategic decisions that inevitably remain outside of it.

JEL-codes: D83 H75 I2 J01 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

Published as Felipe Arteaga & Adam J Kapor & Christopher A Neilson & Seth D Zimmerman, 2022. "Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol 137(3), pages 1791-1848.

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Journal Article: Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice (2022)
Working Paper: Smart Matching Platforms and Heterogeneous Beliefs in Centralized School Choice (2021)
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