Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

Matteo Bobba, Tim Ederer, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta (), Christopher Neilson and Marco Nieddu ()

No 29068, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We exploit data on the universe of public-school teachers and students in Perú to establish that wage rigidity makes teachers choose schools based on non-pecuniary factors, magnifying the existing urban-rural gap in student achievement. Leveraging a reform in the teacher compensation structure, we provide causal evidence that increasing salaries in less desirable locations is effective at improving student learning by attracting higher-quality teachers. We then build and estimate a model of teacher sorting across schools and student achievement production, whereby teachers are heterogeneous in their preferences over non-wage attributes and their comparative advantages in teaching different student types. Counterfactual compensation policies that leverage information about teachers’ preferences and value-added can result in a substantially more efficient and equitable allocation by inducing teachers to sort based on their comparative advantage.

JEL-codes: H52 I20 J3 J45 O15 R23 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru (2024)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru (2022)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú (2021)
Working Paper: Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú (2021)
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