Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú

Matteo Bobba, Tim Ederer, Gianmarco León-Ciliotta (), Christopher Neilson and Marco Nieddu ()

No 29068, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: We exploit data on centralized teacher recruitment in Perú to establish that wage rigidity creates large urban-rural disparities in teacher effectiveness. Leveraging a teacher compensation reform, we provide causal evidence that increasing salaries in less desirable locations attracts qualified teachers and improves student learning. We estimate a model of teacher sorting and student achievement featuring rich heterogeneity in teachers’ preferences and effectiveness. Substantial equity and efficiency gains arise from reallocating existing teachers to exploit match effects or attracting applicants with higher average effectiveness into public teaching. Cost-minimizing counterfactual wage schedules aimed at achieving these gains imply the latter is more cost-effective.

JEL-codes: H52 I20 J3 J45 O15 R23 R58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf, nep-lma and nep-ure
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru (2024)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru (2022)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú (2021)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Perú (2021)
Working Paper: Teacher Compensation and Structural Inequality: Evidence from Centralized Teacher School Choice in Peru (2021)
Working Paper: Teacher compensation and structural inequality: Evidence from centralized teacher school choice in Perú (2021)
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