Vaccine Hesitancy, Passports and the Demand for Vaccination

Joshua Gans

No 29075, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: Vaccine hesitancy is modelled as an endogenous decision within a behavioural SIR model with endogenous agent activity. It is shown that policy interventions that directly target costs associated with vaccine adoption may counter vaccine hesitancy while those that manipulate the utility of unvaccinated agents will either lead to the same or lower rates of vaccine adoption. This latter effect arises with vaccine passports whose effects are mitigated in equilibrium by reductions in viral/disease prevalence that themselves reduce the demand for vaccination.

JEL-codes: I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-isf and nep-upt
Note: EH PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Published as Joshua S. Gans, 2023. "VACCINE HESITANCY, PASSPORTS, AND THE DEMAND FOR VACCINATION," International Economic Review, vol 64(2), pages 641-652.

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Journal Article: VACCINE HESITANCY, PASSPORTS, AND THE DEMAND FOR VACCINATION (2023)
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