Lobbying Behind the Frontier

Matilde Bombardini, Olimpia Cutinelli Rendina and Francesco Trebbi

No 29120, NBER Working Papers from National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc

Abstract: This chapter investigates the non-market response of firms to international trade shocks increasing the level of competition in U.S. industries. Lobbying expenditures increase as a consequence of import changes related to the China shock. The effect on lobbying is not homogeneous across firms and it concentrates particularly in those producers which are behind the technological frontier. We discuss theoretical mechanisms driving lobbying of firms away from the technological frontier: not only the cost-benefit trade-off between innovation and lobbying is relatively less appealing for low productivity firms, but the collective action ability of low productivity firms improves after a competitive shock.

JEL-codes: D72 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-int, nep-isf and nep-pol
Note: POL PR
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Lobbying Behind the Frontier (2021)
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